Economic development and intergenerational earnings mobility: Evidence from Taiwan by Chu, Luke Yu-Wei & Lin, Ming-Jen
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
School of Economics and Finance | Victoria Business School | www.victoria.ac.nz/sef 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Economic development and 
intergenerational earnings 
mobility: Evidence from Taiwan 
 
 
 
Luke Yu-Wei Chu and Ming-Jen Lin 
 
 
SEF WORKING PAPER 17/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper series is published by the School of Economics and Finance to provide 
staff and research students the opportunity to expose their research to a wider audience. The 
opinions and views expressed in these papers are not necessarily reflective of views held by 
the school.  Comments and feedback from readers would be welcomed by the author(s). 
 
 
 
 
Further enquiries to: 
The Administrator 
School of Economics and Finance 
Victoria University of Wellington 
P O Box 600 
Wellington 6140 
New Zealand 
 
Phone: +64 4 463 5353 
Email:   alice.fong@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper 17/2016 
 ISSN 2230-259X  (Print) 
 ISSN 2230-2603  (Online) 
1 
 
Economic Development and Intergenerational  
Earnings Mobility: Evidence from Taiwan 
 
Yu-Wei Luke Chu 
Luke.chu@vuw.ac.nz 
School of Economics and Finance 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
Ming-Jen Lin 
mjlin@ntu.edu.tw 
Department of Economics 
National Taiwan University 
 
August 2016 
 
Abstract 
How economic development affects intergenerational earnings elasticity is not well-
documented. In this paper, we estimate intergenerational earnings elasticities between 
fathers and sons in two periods. In the current period, 2005–2010, Taiwan is already a 
developed economy with slower economic growth. We apply the two-sample approach 
developed by Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and find that intergenerational earnings 
elasticity is around 0.4–0.5 in this period. In the earlier period, 1990–1994, Taiwan was 
still a developing economy with fast economic growth. We mimic the Björklund-Jäntti 
two-sample approach and use average earnings by occupation as a proxy for fathers’ 
earnings. To quantify potential bias, we apply the same method to the 2005–2010 data. 
Our proxy method yields similar estimates in both the early 1990s and late 2000s. These 
results suggest stable intergenerational transmission of economic status in Taiwan, 
despite its rapid economic development.  
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“It's harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart.”  
Timothy Noah, The New Republic, January 13, 2012 
 
1. Introduction 
The persistence of inequality is ubiquitous throughout human history. 
Nevertheless, economists tend to believe that economic development will eventually 
reduce inequality. For example, the famous Kuznets curve suggests that cross-sectional 
inequality will first increase, then decrease, as an economy grows.1 Another important 
dimension of inequality is the intergenerational transmission of economic status. 
Economic theory suggests that there are many causal mechanisms that determine 
intergenerational income associations. However, as evidence on causal mechanisms 
and their relative importance is very sparse, different theoretical models often offer 
different predictions. For instance, some researchers have suggested that economic 
development reduces cross-sectional inequality and increases intergenerational 
mobility through efficient allocation of human capital (Maoz and Moav 1999; Owen 
and Weil 1998). Others point out that economic development and lower inequality may 
not necessarily promote mobility if the intergenerational transmission of abilities plays 
a major role (Han and Mulligan 2001; Iyigun 1995; Solon 2004).  
Empirical research, even if it is correlational in nature, can provide a rich set of 
stylized facts to highlight potential mechanisms and to sharpen future theoretical 
research. However, there have been almost no empirical studies about the relationship 
between economic development and intergenerational income mobility. It is very 
challenging to estimate intergenerational mobility in developing or newly developed 
countries because high-quality data with information on two generations are often 
unavailable. For example, recent literature suggests high intergenerational earnings 
mobility in the fast-growing Asian Tigers: Korea (Choi and Hong 2011; Ueda 2013), 
Singapore (Ng 2007; Ng, Shen, and Ho 2009), and Taiwan (Kan, Li, and Wang 2015; 
Sun and Ueda 2015). However, as most of these studies rely on co-residing father-son 
pairs, the high estimated mobility could be a result of downward bias from using non-
representative samples (Solon 1992). To the best of our knowledge, there is nothing in 
                                                 
1 This traditional view has recently been challenged by many researchers. For example, in his popular 
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty (2014) provides substantial historical evidence of long-
term inequality and argues that the Kuznets curve is in fact a post-World World II anomaly. 
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the literature that documents changes in intergenerational mobility during a period of 
rapid economic development. 
In this paper, we estimate intergenerational earnings elasticities between fathers 
and sons in Taiwan in 1990–1994 and 2005–2010. Taiwan has experienced rapid 
economic growth since the 1960s and has developed into a high-income economy in 
less than four decades. Taiwan was still an upper middle-income economy with high 
growth rates in 1990–1994; the average real GDP per capita (in 2011 Taiwanese dollars) 
was TWD 271,001 and the average growth rate was 7.3%. In 2005–2010, the average 
real GDP per capita had doubled to TWD 540,628 (1 USD ≈ 30 TWD), while the 
average growth rate had slowed to 4.6%. The two generations of fathers are from the 
late 1960s and the late 1970s, which were periods of extremely fast growth with real 
GDP growth rates of more than 10%. Although we do not have a generation from before 
the start of rapid growth because the earliest available data are from the 1960s, the four 
generations of fathers and sons studied in this paper cover most of the economic 
development process in Taiwan. 
The primary samples for sons in this paper are working males aged 35–50 from 
the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) in the early 1990s (1990, 1991, 1992, and 
1994 TSCS) and the late 2000s (2005, 2007, 2009, and 2010 TSCS). The TSCS is a 
representative repeat cross-sectional survey that was designed to track the profound 
economic, political, and social changes taking place in Taiwan, starting in 1990. 
Importantly, the TSCS provides information on the level of education, occupation, and 
industry of the fathers of survey respondents when the respondents were 15 years old. 
Our main empirical strategy is the Björklund and Jäntti (1997) two-sample method that 
utilizes a secondary sample to predict fathers’ missing earnings. To avoid potential bias 
in the predicted earnings, as the average age of sons is about 40 years old, the secondary 
sample should be drawn from roughly 25 years ago when they were 15 to be consistent 
with the fathers’ information in the primary sample. For the current period, 2005–2010, 
we use working males aged 35–50 from the Manpower Utilization Survey (MUS) in 
1978–1982 as a secondary sample of potential fathers. For the earlier period, 1990–
1994, because the microdata were not available, we use average earnings by occupation 
of household heads from the 1968 and 1970 Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 
(SFIE) government reports as a proxy for fathers’ missing earnings. This proxy method 
is essentially equivalent to using occupations to predict earnings in an unrestricted 
secondary sample by the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample approach. To quantify the 
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bias and facilitate comparison between the two periods, we apply the proxy method to 
the 2005–2010 data using average occupational earnings from the 1981 SFIE 
government report.  
Our results suggest that intergenerational earnings elasticity between fathers 
and sons in Taiwan is around 0.4–0.5 in the late 2000s. Intergenerational earnings 
mobility in Taiwan is similar to relatively less mobile countries such as the U.K and the 
U.S. We also apply the decomposition method from Lefgren, Lindquist, and Sims (2012) 
and find that intergenerational transmission of human capital can account for the 
majority of the intergenerational earnings elasticity in Taiwan in this period. 
Surprisingly, despite significant economic development in Taiwan, intergenerational 
earnings mobility appears to have been stable over time. The estimates for 
intergenerational earnings elasticity from the proxy method are around 0.37 in both the 
early 1990s and the late 2000s. The estimates in both periods are similar even within 
each age group. True intergenerational earnings elasticity in Taiwan is likely of the 
same magnitude, around 0.4–0.5, for the entire period.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. We use 
carefully chosen representative samples to provide more reliable estimates of 
intergenerational earnings elasticity in Taiwan. Our results suggest that the high 
mobility reported in the literature for the Asian Tigers is possibly the result of non-
representative samples. More importantly, we find that intergenerational earnings 
elasticity has remained stable, even though Taiwan has gone through fundamental 
economic and social changes. This finding appears to be consistent with the notion that 
the intergenerational transmission of ability, which is likely to be relatively stable, is 
the main channel for the intergenerational transmission of economic status.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, and 
Section 3 briefly introduces the background in Taiwan. We discuss the TSCS, MUS 
and SFIE datasets in Section 4 and the regression models in Section 5. Section 6 
presents the estimation results, and in Section 7 we state our conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Considering the significance of persistent income inequality, it is surprising that 
intergenerational mobility did not attract much attention from economists until the 
seminal work of Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992). They find an elasticity of about 
0.4 in the U.S. and suggest that the small estimates in the previous literature are the 
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result of measurement error and non-representative samples. As data with earnings 
from two generations are often unavailable, Björklund and Jäntti (1997) construct a 
two-sample estimator that predicts fathers’ earnings from a secondary sample and use 
the predicted earnings as a generated regressor.   
Intergenerational income transmission appears to be stronger in less developed 
countries and in countries with more cross-sectional income inequality (Blanden 2013; 
Bratsberg et al. 2007; Corak 2013; Solon 1999, 2002, 2015). Chetty, Hendren, Kline, 
and Saez (2014) find a strong correlation between intergenerational income association 
and cross-sectional inequality across areas within the U.S. as well. Naturally, there is 
growing concern that intergenerational income mobility is declining due to the large 
rise in overall income inequality in the U.S. in recent years (Mayer and Lopoo 2005). 
Surprisingly, recent studies show that intergenerational income mobility in the U.S. has 
remained stable (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, et al. 2014; Lee and Solon 2009). The 
available evidence also suggests no broad trends in intergenerational income 
persistence across many European countries (Bratberg, Anti Nilsen, and Vaage 2005; 
Lefranc and Trannoy 2005; Nicoletti and Ermisch John 2007; Pekkala and Lucas 2007).  
Solon (2004) modifies the theoretical model in Becker and Tomes (1979) and 
shows that intergenerational income elasticity decreases with the progressivity of public 
investment in human capital, but that it becomes greater with stronger heritability of 
income-generating traits, more productive human capital investment, and higher returns 
to human capital. 2  Therefore, cross-country differences in both intergenerational 
mobility and cross-sectional income inequality could arise from differences in any of 
these factors. It is also possible that the effects of two or more factors may cancel each 
other out, so that intergenerational income mobility remains stable over time. 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the causal mechanisms and their relative 
importance in determining intergenerational income transmission is very limited. (See 
a comprehensive literature review by Black and Devereux (2011).) Lefgren, Lindquist, 
and Sims (2012) suggest a decomposition method that compares estimators from 
different earnings predictors (and the OLS estimator). They find that human capital 
transmission accounts for the majority of intergenerational income elasticity in Sweden, 
while fathers’ financial resources play only a minor role.   
                                                 
2 There is macroeconomic literature that models intergenerational income mobility in terms of human 
capital, inheritable ability, liquidity constraint, and redistributive policy (Durlauf 1996; Han and 
Mulligan 2001; Hidalgo Cabrillana 2009; Iyigun 1995; Maoz and Moav 1999; Owen and Weil 1998). 
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The literature on intergenerational mobility is limited in East Asian countries 
due to data availability problems. Only a handful of studies are available in China (Deng, 
Gustafsson, and Li 2013; Gong, Leigh, and Meng 2012), Japan (Lefranc, Ojima, and 
Yoshida 2014; Ueda 2009), Korea (Choi and Hong 2011; Kim 2013; Ueda 2013), 
Singapore (Ng 2007; Ng, Shen, and Ho 2009), and Taiwan (Kan, Li, and Wang 2015; 
Sun and Ueda 2015). Intergenerational earnings elasticities between fathers and sons 
appear to be 0.5 or greater in urban China, 0.4 in Japan, and around 0.25 among the 
Asian Tigers. However, in order to have information on both generations, many studies 
rely on non-representative samples such as co-residing father-son pairs (Choi and Hong 
2011; Deng, Gustafsson, and Li 2013; Kan, Li, and Wang 2015; Ng 2007; Ng, Shen, 
and Ho 2009; Ueda 2013). Not only is sample selection a problem, there could also be 
substantial life-cycle bias, because the fathers tend to be too old and the sons too young 
among these pairs (Haider and Solon 2006). For example, the co-residing rate is only 
about 40% in Taiwan, and these families tend to be relatively poorer (Chu and Yu 2009). 
Because Kan, Li, and Wang (2015) use a co-residing sample, the average age of sons 
in their study is only 30. Since Taiwanese men need to complete two to three years of 
compulsory military service before entering the labor market, these sons are still in the 
early stages of their careers, and their short-run earnings are not a good proxy for 
permanent earnings.  
The Asian literature relies strongly on the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample 
approach. However, one potential problem that is rarely discussed in the literature is 
prediction bias: the distribution of predicted earnings will not necessarily represent the 
distribution of true earnings. Many studies use current occupations to predict permanent 
earnings (Gong, Leigh, and Meng 2012; Lefranc, Ojima, and Yoshida 2014; Ng 2007; 
Ng, Shen, and Ho 2009; Ueda 2009), ignoring the possibility that a person’s occupation 
may change over their life cycle. Moreover, in many studies, the secondary samples are 
only a few years apart from the primary samples and they may not reflect the labor 
market for the real fathers (Kan, Li, and Wang 2015; Sun and Ueda 2015; Ueda 2009, 
2013). For example, the primary sample in Sun and Ueda (2015) is from 2004–2008, 
but the secondary sample is from 1998, only six to ten years earlier. In Kan, Li, and 
Wang (2015), the secondary sample is from 1978–1988 and even overlaps with the 
primary sample, which is from 1988–2006. Since the relationships between earnings 
and their predictors in a fast-growing economy can change rapidly, the secondary 
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sample needs to be drawn from the particular time when the real fathers were at their 
prime working age (Kim 2013).   
 
3. Background in Taiwan 
Taiwan has been rapidly growing since the 1960s along with the other Asian 
Tigers. Figure 1 shows real GDP per capita (in 2011 Taiwanese dollars) from 1965–
2010. It doubled about every ten years until 1995. It was only TWD 39,429 (USD 986) 
in 1965. It increased to TWD 79,658 (USD 2,096) in 1975, TWD 160,128 (USD 4,017) 
in 1985, and TWD 323,363 (USD 12,207) in 1995.3 In 2010, real GDP per capita 
reached TWD 595,811 (USD 18,825). (Purchasing power parity GDP per capita was 
USD 38,593 in 2010.) Figure 2 shows real GDP growth rates in Taiwan from 1965–
2010. Taiwan enjoyed extremely fast economic growth prior to 1985. Average growth 
rates were 10.6% in 1965–1974 and 9.3% in 1975–1984. The average real GDP growth 
rate was 7.3% in 1990–1994 when Taiwan was still an upper middle-income economy. 
However, as Taiwan became a high-income economy, average GDP growth rates 
slowed to 5.1% in 1995–2004 and 4.6% in 2005–2010. The Gini coefficients are 
presented in Figure 3. Interestingly, the Kuznets curve is not applicable to Taiwan. 
Inequality appears to decrease at first, but it has been increasing since 1980. The Gini 
coefficient rises from 0.31 in 1990 to 0.34 in 2010. 
Taiwan has undergone significant political and social changes starting in the 
late 1980s. It had been under martial law for more than 38 years, but martial law was 
ended in 1987. The parliament (Legislative Yuan), which was elected in 1947 and was 
supposed to represent mainland China constituencies, resigned in 1991, and a new 
parliament was elected in 1992. The first direct presidential election took place in 1996. 
However, it was not until 2000 that the major opposition party (the Democratic 
Progressive Party, DPP) won the presidential election for the first time. This ended 
more than 50 years of hegemony by the former ruling party (the Kuomintang, KMT). 
Taiwan has become a stable democracy. The 2016 presidential election brought party 
alternation for the third time and the first female president.  
The considerations just discussed suggest that sons in the early 1990s were 
living and working in a society very different from sons in the late 2000s. Taiwan was 
                                                 
3 Year 2011 is the base year, in which the GDP deflator equals 100. The USD values are based on the 
official exchange rates for each year. Figures 1 and 2 are based on data from the Directorate General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan.  
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still a developing economy with high growth rates in the early 1990s. However, Taiwan 
had become a developed economy with slower growth rates and democracy by the late 
2000s. Cross-sectional inequality also increases during this period. In the next section, 
the data will also show the generational differences in labor force composition across 
the four generations of fathers and sons.  
 
4. Data   
In this paper, we use the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) as our primary 
sample for sons in both periods studied, 2005–2010 and 1990–1994. Since the TSCS 
does not have information on earnings for the participants’ fathers, but only earnings 
predictors for them, we utilize two other datasets to obtain fathers’ earnings. We use 
the Manpower Utilization Survey (MUS) in 1978–1982 for the current period, 2005–
2010, and the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE) in 1968 and 1970 for 
the earlier period, 1990–1994. We discuss these datasets in detail below.  
 
4.1. The Current Period, 2005–2010 
As few datasets have information for the earnings of two generations, many 
studies apply the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample method that predicts fathers’ 
earnings from a secondary sample. Although common earning predictors such as 
education, industry, and occupation are available in most datasets, the data 
requirements for this approach are still very demanding.  Haider and Solon (2006) 
suggest using earnings from the prime working age, 30–50 years old, for both 
generations to minimize so-called life-cycle bias. Therefore, while many surveys, for 
example, ask respondents about their fathers’ current occupations, we need to know 
what the fathers’ occupations were when they were 30–50 years old, to minimize life-
cycle bias in the predicted earnings. More importantly, not only may people change 
occupations, the returns from different occupations may change as well. The 
relationship between earnings and their predictors may not remain the same over time. 
Therefore, to reduce prediction bias (and thus life-cycle bias), we need the information 
on earnings predictors and the fathers’ sample to be drawn from the time when fathers 
were at prime working age.  
In this paper, we use the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) as our primary 
sample for sons. The TSCS is a repeated cross-sectional survey, a representative sample 
of Taiwanese adult individuals aged 18 and above. The survey was first conducted in 
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1984–1985 as a pilot study. It has been since conducted every year from 1990 to the 
present. While the TSCS was designed to track social changes and it thus focuses on 
cultural, social, and political considerations, it does contain information on respondents’ 
earnings and relevant earnings predictors for respondents and their fathers. The 
earnings measure in the TSCS is pre-tax monthly earnings (labor income).4 Moreover, 
the TSCS asks survey participants what their father’s educational level, industry, and 
occupation was when they were 15 years old. For the current period, we use the TSCS 
from 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010, years in which all of the required information was 
requested in the surveys.5 Taiwanese men need to serve in the military for two to three 
years; the average retirement age is also relatively young, around 55–60. 6  As 
Taiwanese men enter the labor market relatively late and leave it relatively early, we 
restrict the sample to working males aged 35–50 (born in 1955–1975) with positive 
earnings. We also restrict the sample to respondents whose fathers were alive when 
they were 15. This leads to a sample size of 1,299 in the primary sample of sons.   
Since we do not have data on fathers’ earnings when the sons were 15 years old, 
we need another sample to predict fathers’ missing earnings. As the average age of sons 
in the primary sample is 43 years old, the secondary sample of potential fathers should 
be drawn from around 28 years earlier. We use the Manpower Utilization Survey (MUS) 
for 1978–1982, which is repeated cross-sectional data available every year since 1978. 
The MUS is a large representative sample of the Taiwanese labor force (aged 15 and 
above) with more than 15,000 households (about 50,000 individuals) interviewed every 
year. We restrict our secondary sample of potential fathers to working males aged 35–
50 who have positive earnings and information available on their educational levels, 
                                                 
4 The earnings variable in 2005–2010 TSCS is recorded in 19 brackets in TWD 10,000 (about USD 300): 
TWD 1–10,000, TWD 10,001–20,000 ... TWD 190,001–200,000, and two top brackets: TWD 200,001–
300,000 and TWD 300,001 and above. For the top bracket, we take TWD 300,000 as respondents’ 
earnings. For the lower brackets, we take mid-points to be respondents’ earnings: 5000, 15,000 … 
195,000, 250,000. We also estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity using interval regressions as a 
robustness check. 
5 Since the second round of the TSCS, each round lasts for five years, with ten different questionnaires 
in use. Two random samples of adults are selected each year to complete two questionnaires. We use two 
surveys in 2005 and one survey in 2007, 2009, and 2010. The 2010 data are from the sixth round of the 
TSCS.  All other data are from the fifth round of the TSCS.  
6 The average self-reported retirement age was 54.9 in 2005 and 56.6, in 2010 based on the Survey on 
Turnover and Movement of Employees. As some people continue to work after they retire from their 
primary jobs, the average retirement age based on labor force participation was around 61 from 2005–
2010.  
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industries, and occupations.7 The sample size in the secondary sample of potential 
fathers is 29,254. 8   
The earnings predictors need to be coded in exactly the same way in both the 
primary and secondary samples in order to apply the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample 
estimator. For education, there are seven categories in the MUS but twenty categories 
in the TSCS. We aggregate the finer categories in the TSCS to the seven categories in 
the MUS: no formal education, elementary school, middle school, general high school, 
vocational high school, junior/vocational college, university and above.9 Both the MUS 
and TSCS record industries using Taiwan’s standard 2-digit industrial classification 
system.10 We aggregate industries in both datasets to the following nine categories, 
based on the first digit of the classification: agriculture, fishing, and forestry; mining; 
manufacturing; utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade; transport, storage, and 
communication; finance, insurance, real estate, and business services; education, public 
administration, and personal services. The occupations in the TSCS are reported in its 
own 3-digit classification. While the TSCS classification is not exactly the same as the 
3-digit standard occupational classification in the MUS, we are able to aggregate the 
occupations in the TSCS to the seven 1-digit categories in the MUS: professionals and 
technicians; administrative executives and managerial workers; clerical workers; sales 
workers; service workers; agricultural, fishery, and forestry workers; production 
workers, transport workers, and laborers.11    
Table 1 presents the ages, earnings, and distributions of educational levels, 
industries, and occupations of fathers and sons. We apply the corresponding sampling 
weights in each dataset to create the descriptive statistics. Columns (1) and (2) show 
the distributions of earnings predictors of sons and their fathers from the 2005–2010 
TSCS. Although sons’ earnings predictors are not needed for estimation, they vividly 
illustrate the generational changes in the Taiwanese labor force. For example, the sons 
                                                 
7 The MUS asks people about their secondary jobs, but it only reports earnings from the primary job. 
However, 98% of working males aged 35–50 report having only one job. 
8 The MUS does not ask male participants whether they have children or not. Although it is possible to 
identify whether a male household heads have children through reports from their wives, the information 
is very incomplete. Only half of wives report this information.    
9 We combine illiterate and no formal education into one category. We treat both 2-year and 4-year 
military and police academies as junior/vocational colleges. Cadet school is coded as vocational high 
school.   
10 The 1-digit categories are identical in both datasets, but the TSCS is based on a newer 2-digit standard 
industrial classification and has slightly finer industries categories than the MUS. 
11 All the agriculture, fishing, and forestry workers are in the agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry. 
However, that industry also includes managerial workers such as farm owners.   
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are much more educated and less likely to work in the agricultural sector. Column (3) 
reports earnings, age, and the distributions of earnings predictors for working males 
aged 35–50 from the 1978–1981 MUS. Columns (2) and (3) show that the two samples 
are indeed comparable and match each other well in terms of the relative distributions 
of earnings predictors. Only minor differences exist. For example, compared to the 
working males in the MUS, there is a higher proportion of real fathers in the TSCS who 
have no formal education, who work in the agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry, 
or who are agriculture, fishing or forestry workers. Some of the difference may be due 
to reporting error, since the TSCS asks survey participants to recall information about 
their fathers from decades earlier. It is also possible that real fathers are from slightly 
older cohorts than the working males in the MUS.12   
 
4.2. The Earlier Period, 1990–1994 
For the earlier period, we use the TSCS from 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1994 to 
create our primary sample of sons.13 The TSCS in those years asked respondents what 
their father’s educational level, industry, and occupation was when they were 15 years 
old (1992 and 1994) or 18 years old (1990 and 1991), if their fathers were alive at that 
time. The coding of these earning predictors is essentially the same as the 2005–2010 
TSCS, and we are able to aggregate to seven education categories, nine industry 
categories, and seven occupational categories. We restrict our primary sample to 
working males aged 35–50 (born in 1940–1959) with positive earnings.14  This leads to 
a sample size of 2,143 in our primary sample of sons.  
In Table 2, column (1) presents age, earnings, and earnings predictors for the 
sons from the 1990–1994 TSCS data. The composition of the Taiwanese workforce in 
the early 1990s was very different from what it was in the late 2000s, as shown in Table 
1. For example, in column (1), while most people have some formal education, one-
third of them have only an elementary school degree. (Taiwan increased its compulsory 
                                                 
12 Only the 2007 TSCS asks respondents for their father’s age. The average father-son age difference in 
the TSCS data is 31 years, with a standard deviation of 7 years. This implies the average age of real 
fathers would have been 46 when the sons were 15. The estimate of intergenerational earnings elasticity 
is nearly identical if we restrict the MUS sample to fathers 40–55 years old (not reported).  
13 We use one survey in 1990 and two surveys in 1991, 1992, and 1994. All data are from the second 
round of the TSCS.  
14 The top income bracket is TWD 200,000 in the 1990–1994 TSCS. Earnings in the 1990 TSCS are 
recorded in their original values. Earnings are recorded in TWD 20,000 brackets in the 1991 TSCS, while 
earnings in the 1992 and 1994 TSCS are recorded in TWD 10,000 brackets, as in the 2005–2010 TSCS. 
The estimates in the next section are quantitatively similar if we exclude data from 1991.  
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education requirement from six years to nine years in 1968.) Also, a substantial share 
of the labor force was still employed in the agricultural sector in the early 1990s. 
Column (2) shows the distributions of earnings predictors for the fathers reported in the 
1990–1994 TSCS. It is clear that the fathers in Table 2 are older than the fathers in 
Table 1. The fathers in column (2) have very low educational attainments; less than 
20% of them have a middle-school degree or higher. The agricultural sector accounts 
for a large share of Taiwan economy; half of the fathers in column (2) are agricultural, 
fishery, or forestry workers. It is easily seen from Tables 1 and 2 that since then Taiwan 
has significantly improved its workforce and been transformed from an agricultural to 
an industrial economy. 
As the average age of sons in the 1990–1994 TSCS data was 41 years old, and 
they were asked for information about their fathers from when they were 15 or 18 years 
old, the secondary sample should be drawn from about 25 years earlier, i.e., the late 
1960s. Unlike most newly developed countries, Taiwan has many extensive datasets 
from earlier years because of institutions that were first developed by the Japanese 
colonial government and later continued by the Taiwanese government. One limitation 
is that the original microdata of many early datasets are unavailable, so we can only 
rely on summary statistics from government publications. To investigate the validity of 
the father characteristics reported in the TSCS, we compare them with the summary 
statistics from the 1968 Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China, which 
is available for every year since 1946 and which provides population counts by gender 
in each education, industry, and occupation category. Column (3) in Table 2 shows the 
distributions of education levels, industries, and occupations among employed males 
aged 15 and above in 1968.15 The finance, insurance, real estate, and business services 
industry was not reported separately in 1968; rather, it was combined with the public 
administration, education, and personal services industry. Even though we cannot 
restrict the age range in column (3), the distributions of earnings predictors in column 
(3) are very similar to those in column (2). 
Unfortunately, the 1968 Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China 
does not report earnings. One dataset with information on earnings and their predictors 
                                                 
15 The levels of education are from the Taiwan Demographic Fact Book, Republic of China because the 
Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China does not separate a university degree from a 
junior college degree. The data in both reports are from the same source. The distribution of education 
in column (3) is based on all males aged 15 and above who are not students, regardless of their 
employment status.  
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in this period is the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE). The SFIE is a 
representative household survey that was first conducted biennially from 1964–1970 
with a sample size of about 3,000 households. It then became an annual survey with 
growing sample sizes. Although the microdata of the SFIE before 1976 are not available, 
the 1968 Report on the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure provides information 
on average household earnings by occupation of household heads.16 For robustness, we 
also use average earnings from the 1970 SFIE report.17 In Table 3, the upper and middle 
panels present the distributions, average household monthly earnings, and the average 
numbers of people employed per household in 1968 and 1970 by occupation of 
household heads. The distributions of household heads’ occupations in 1968 and 1970 
are very close to the real fathers’ occupations in Table 2. So the SFIE data are indeed 
drawn from a population comparable to the real fathers in the TSCS. The lower panel 
shows the same information in 1981 from the 1981 SFIE report. The distribution of 
occupations in 1981 is also similar to fathers’ occupations in Table 1. 
  
5. Regression Model 
Our main empirical strategy is to estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity 
by the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample method, which is the standard methodology 
when fathers’ and sons’ earnings are not available in one dataset. As the theoretical 
properties of this approach have been thoroughly discussed in many papers, such as 
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Inoue and Solon (2010), we focus on the empirical 
models in this section.  
If the data provide lifetime earnings for both generations, we can easily estimate 
the intergenerational earnings elasticity by OLS: 
 
1) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 =  𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 
 
                                                 
16  The earnings measure is the sum of the following three sources of labor incomes: wages, net 
agricultural income, and mixed income that consists of net operation surplus and net professional income. 
We divide annual earnings by 12 to get monthly earnings. 
17 The 1970 data are from the 1974 Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan 
Area, which includes information back through 1970. The Report on the Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure series does not include the SFIE data from Taipei city (the capital) after 1968 due to the 
separation of responsible statistics departments. The 1981 data are from the 1981 Report on the Survey 
of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area. 
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where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 are the permanent earnings of sons and their fathers in logarithm, and 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is an error term that is orthogonal to 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓. The intergenerational earnings elasticity, β, 
is the linear projection of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 and it is therefore not a causal relationship but a 
correlation. One can show that β is the correlation coefficient between 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓when 
their variances are equal to one other. In practice, researchers often rely on short-run 
measures like current earnings as a proxy for permanent earnings, but this introduces a 
measurement error into the variables and causes the estimate of β to be biased. In 
general, not just a noisy independent variable, but a noisy dependent variable, could 
cause bias in the estimate. Haider and Solon (2006) point out that the traditional 
classical measurement error assumption is not valid in this context because of changing 
earnings profiles over the life cycle.18 In this paper, we restrict our main samples to 
males aged 35–50 to minimize the life-cycle bias.  
To estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity in 2005–2010, we first estimate 
the following model by OLS using the MUS sample, in order to predict fathers’ missing 
earnings:  
 
2) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖ϒ + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖2 +  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  is monthly earnings in logarithm and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  is a vector of earnings predictors 
including dummy variables for the seven education levels, nine industry categories, and 
seven occupational categories. We also control for age and its square and dummy 
variables for each year in the MUS. 
Next, we use ϒ� to predict the permanent component of fathers’ log earnings, and 
then regress sons’ log earnings on fathers’ predicted log earnings in the TSCS sample: 
 
3) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 =  𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠2 + 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  is sons’ log monthly earnings and 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓ϒ�  is fathers’ predicted log 
monthly earnings based on a vector of earnings predictors 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓reported in the TSCS. We 
                                                 
18 The life-cycle bias arises because the slope coefficient in the linear projection of current (observed) 
earnings on permanent earnings differs from unity at the early or late stage of the life cycle. (ypermanent = 
λyshort-run + ε, where λ ≠ 1.) In fact, life-cycle bias could result in amplification bias rather than attenuation 
bias. 
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control for sons’ age, age squared, and dummy variables for each year in the TSCS. In 
order to account for randomness in the two different samples, we resample both the 
primary and secondary samples with 1,000 replications to obtain the bootstrapped 
standard errors as suggested by Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Inoue and Solon 
(2010).19 Since introducing sampling weights complicates the bootstrap, as is common 
in the literature, we do not use sampling weights in all of the regressions. All of the 
point estimates in this paper are quantitatively similar with sampling weights.  
To estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity in 1990–1994, we replace 
fathers’ missing earnings by average occupational earnings and estimate the following 
model by OLS:  
 
4) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 =  𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠2 + 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 is sons’ log monthly earnings and 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is average earnings by occupation in 
logarithm. 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is obtained by dividing average household earnings (column (2) in Table 
3) by the average number of people employed (column (3) in Table 3) and then taking 
the logarithm. Because our focus is to investigate the change in intergenerational 
earnings mobility, we also estimate Equation (4) using the 2005–2010 TSCS data, 
where average occupational earnings are calculated from the 1981 SFIE report. We use 
bootstrap to estimate the standard errors with 1,000 replications.20 
Notice that predicted earnings without an age adjustment are simply the average 
earnings by occupation, when occupations are the only earnings predictors in Equation 
(2).21 If we have average earnings of household heads, Equation (4) is essentially the 
same as applying the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample method in a secondary sample 
of household heads without restricting their age and gender. As most real fathers are 
household heads, this proxy method should introduce little bias into the estimates, even 
with an unrestricted secondary sample. However, only household earnings are available 
in the SFIE reports, and the average earnings that we construct, 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜, suffer a division 
                                                 
19 Inoue and Solon (2010) also provide a consistent estimator for the standard error. 
20 The estimated standard errors could be underestimated because we do not have a secondary sample 
and therefore ignore randomness in the average earnings. However, in Table 7, for the 2005–2010 data, 
the estimated (bootstrap) standard errors using averages (columns (5) and (6)) are similar to those using 
microdata (columns (7) and (8)). Therefore, the magnitude of the bias should be small.     
21 The Björklund and Jäntti two-sample estimator often predicts earnings in logarithm. Using average 
occupational earnings is equivalent to using occupations to predict earnings in levels and then taking the 
logarithm of the predicted earnings.  
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bias. 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 assumes an equal share of earnings among workers within a household and 
therefore underestimates the average earnings of household heads. If the magnitudes of 
division bias, the ratios of 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 to true household head earnings, differ across occupations, 
the estimate of β in Equation (4) would be biased. 22 More importantly, while the 
estimates may be biased, we can still compare the estimated elasticities from the two 
periods, so long as the magnitudes of bias remain stable, that is, if these ratios do not 
change over time in each occupational category.23  
 
6. Estimation Results 
6.1. The Current Period, 2005–2010 
In Table 4, we present the estimates for earnings predictors from Equation (2) 
in the MUS sample. The omitted education category is no formal education, and the 
omitted industry and occupational categories are the agriculture, fishing, forestry 
industry and workers. All of the estimates for industries and occupations are positive 
and significant, suggesting that workers from the agricultural sector earn significantly 
less than workers from other industries and occupations. Other estimates are also 
consistent with our expectations. For example, workers with better education earn more, 
managerial workers have the highest earnings, and so forth. The more important 
statistic in Table 4 is the R-squared that measures the predictive power of the regressors. 
The adjusted R-squared equals 0.46. Because our goal is to predict permanent earnings, 
we also calculate the partial R-squared from the above regression by partialling out age, 
age squared, and dummies for each year. The partial R-squared remains a good size and 
equals 0.35, indicating that level of education, industry, and occupation are strong 
predictors of permanent earnings.  
We report the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample estimates of intergenerational 
earnings elasticity from Equation (3) in Table 5. In column (1), we use all earnings 
predictors shown in Table 4 and regress sons’ log monthly earnings on their fathers’ 
predicted log monthly earnings. The estimate of intergenerational earnings elasticity 
                                                 
22 We calculate these ratios using the 1981 SFIE microdata and find that they are fairly similar across 
occupations. These ratios range from 0.7–0.8, except for the category of agricultural workers, in which 
the ratio is 0.6. If these ratios are similar in the 1968 and 1970 SFIE data, the bias in our estimates due 
to such division bias in 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is probably not overly large. 
23 We find that the average share of household wages earned by household heads is about 80% in both 
1966 and 1981. Unfortunately, this information is only available for wage income, and we are not able 
to compare it within occupations because the occupation categories in the 1966 report are not comparable 
to those in later reports.  
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equals 0.45 in this period.24 Our estimate is substantially greater than the previous 
estimates of around 0.25 from Kan, Li, and Wang (2015) and Sun and Ueda (2015). As 
Solon (1992) has pointed out, non-representative samples can cause severe downward 
bias in the estimates. The larger estimate is what we would expect from correcting such 
bias in the previous studies. In fact, if we restrict our primary sample to working males 
aged 26–45 years old who are co-residing with their fathers, as in Kan, Li, and Wang 
(2015), we find a similar intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.22 (not reported in 
the paper). Our result shows that intergenerational earnings mobility in Taiwan is not 
as high as previous studies suggest.  
In columns (2) – (4), instead of using all earnings predictors, we use only two 
out of three sets of predictors to predict fathers’ earnings. The estimates remain 
quantitatively similar to column (1), ranging from 0.40–0.48. In the last three columns, 
columns (5) – (7), only one set of earnings predictors is used in the first stage regression. 
Using only industry or occupation yields similar estimates of about 0.4. However, using 
only level of education gives a much larger estimate of 0.79. As education is strongly 
correlated with income generating traits and abilities, and the intergenerational 
transmission of these traits is likely stronger than the intergenerational income 
correlation, using education as an earnings predictor may introduce upward bias into 
the estimates (Solon 1992). Given the intense competition in the Taiwanese education 
system, such a mechanism is probably even stronger in Taiwan, and it is not surprising 
to get a large (but biased) estimate for intergenerational earnings elasticity by using 
education attainment as a predictor. To check the robustness of our results, as sons’ 
earnings are originally recorded in intervals (Note 4), we estimate intergenerational 
earnings elasticity by interval regressions. These results are in Appendix Table A1 and 
remain quantitatively similar to those in Table 5. Since the 1985 TSCS has comparable 
information on industries and occupations (but not education), as another robustness 
check, we also use the 1985 TSCS as the secondary sample, and the estimate of 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is 0.43 (not reported in the paper). 
The finding that the intergenerational earnings elasticity in Taiwan is similar to 
relatively less mobile countries like the U.K. and the U.S. is especially notable. 
Intuitively, we would expect fathers’ earnings to be correlated only weakly with sons’ 
                                                 
24 The estimate for intergenerational earnings elasticity equals 0.47 if we predict earnings in levels and 
then take the log of the predicted earnings. Notice that the estimates for age and year dummies in 
Equation (2) are needed for predicting fathers’ earnings in levels.  
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earnings, because the fathers’ generation experienced fast economic growth, and cross-
sectional inequality in Taiwan was at its lowest level around 1980. A potential 
explanation is that parental financial resources may not play a major role in 
intergenerational earnings transmission in Taiwan. Indeed, such explanation is 
consistent with the result in column (7) that the estimate is largest when education 
attainment is used as the only predictor. Lefgren, Lindquist, and Sims (2012) 
decompose intergenerational earnings elasticity into the effects of the father’s financial 
resources on the son’s earnings (π1) and the effects of intergenerational transmission of 
human capital (π2). Here, they refer human capita transmission as mechanistic 
persistence across generations that is independent of the level of financial investment 
such as genetic transmission of attributes and at-home nonfinancial investments. They 
suggest that π2 equals to 
  β�edu– β  
1 – 𝑅𝑅2 , where   β�edu  is the estimate from using level of 
education as the only predictor, β is intergenerational earnings elasticity, and R2 is the 
R-squared from a Mincer regression that regresses paternal permanent income on 
human capital variables.25 Regressing fathers’ permanent earnings (partialling out age, 
age-squared, and year dummies) on levels of education yields an R-squared of 0.13 in 
the MUS sample. If we take the two-sample estimate of 0.45 in column (1) to be β, then 
the above formula implies a π2 of 0.39. Therefore, the majority of intergenerational 
earnings elasticity in Taiwan appears to be driven by the effect of human capital 
transmission. Since education is used as an earnings predictor, our two-sample estimate 
could be biased slightly upward. As the true β may be smaller, and the true fraction of 
paternal earnings explained by human capital may be larger than the estimated Mincer 
R-squared, we probably underestimate the importance of π2.  
Table 6 presents the estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticity by age 
group (the upper panel) and by cohort (the lower panel). All of the earnings predictors 
are used to predict fathers’ earnings. In the upper panel, in column (1) we increase the 
age range of sons in the TSCS data to 30–55 years old. (The age range in the MUS 
sample remains 35–50.) The estimate for intergenerational earnings elasticity is 0.46, 
nearly identical to the results in Table 5. Columns (2) – (5) show the estimates in four 
                                                 
25  Lefgren, Lindquist, and Sims (2012) show that the OLS estimate is a consistent estimate of 
intergenerational earnings elasticity (β), which equals π1 + R2·π2, while an estimate that uses education 
as the predictor is a consistent estimate of π1 + π2. Therefore, π2 = 
  β�edu– β  
1 – 𝑅𝑅2 . More generally, Lefgren, 
Lindquist, and Sims (2012) suggest that   β�edu– β  
1−𝑅𝑅2
 is a lower bound of π2.   
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overlapping age groups: 30–40, 35–45, 40–50, and 45–55. There appears to be life-
cycle bias in the youngest age group. In column (2), the estimate for 30–40 year olds is 
only 0.32, substantially smaller than the estimates for the older age groups. In columns 
(3) and (4), the two age groups belong to the main sample (ages 35–50), and the results 
are quantitatively similar to the results in Table 5. The estimate in column (5) is a bit 
large. Because the real fathers in column (5) would be older, the earnings relationships 
estimated from the 1978–1982 MUS sample may be less reflective of the earnings 
structure for some of these fathers. The potential threats of prediction bias and life-
cycle bias are the reasons why we restrict our main sample in Table 5 to a narrow age 
range. 
Most studies in the literature, such as Lefranc, Ojima, and Yoshida (2014) and 
Kan, Li, and Wang (2015), rely on cohort-specific estimates to identify the trend in 
intergenerational mobility. However, this approach is problematic because of the 
collinearity between age and cohorts (Lee and Solon 2009). In Table 6, the lower panel 
vividly illustrates this problem. The estimates from the five overlapping cohorts show 
exactly the same pattern as the age-specific estimates in the upper panel. The estimates 
are smaller among the younger cohorts and larger among the older cohorts. The 
differences in the estimates across cohorts likely reflect life-cycle bias rather than 
changes in intergenerational earnings mobility. Therefore, we need additional data from 
earlier periods in order to estimate intergenerational mobility for older cohorts. One 
might be concerned that our main sample (columns (3) and (4) in the upper panel) also 
contains a small fraction of cohorts that could be too young or too old. For example, 
for people born in 1955 (1975), fathers’ earnings are predicted using the 1978–1982 
MUS sample, but the information on father’s earnings predictors was actually drawn 
from 1970 (1990), when these people were 15 years old. To address this concern, note 
that the cohort in column (3) in the lower panel is strictly consistent with the sample 
period of the MUS sample, and that the estimate is nearly identical to the main results 
in Table 5.  
 
6.2. The Earlier Period, 1990–1994, and Change in Intergenerational Mobility 
In Table 7, we investigate the change in intergenerational earnings mobility. In 
columns (1) – (4), the primary sample for sons is the 1990–1994 TSCS. In columns (5) 
– (8), the primary sample for sons is the 2005–2010 TSCS. The majority of the two 
samples are indeed from different cohorts; the sons in the 2005–2010 TSCS were born 
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in 1955–1975, while the sons in the 1990–1994 TSCS were born in 1940–1959. In 
columns (1) and (2), the average earnings are based on seven occupation categories, 
and the estimate for intergenerational earnings elasticity is 0.38. In the SFIE 
government reports, average earnings for 1968 are originally reported in nine categories, 
and average earnings for 1970 in eight categories.26 Columns (3) and (4) show the 
results based on these slightly finer averages. The estimates are nearly identical and 
equal to 0.38. In columns (5) and (6), we proxy fathers’ permanent earnings by average 
earnings in seven or nine occupation categories from the 1981 SFIE report. The 
estimates for the intergenerational earnings elasticity are 0.36–0.37. The results suggest 
that intergenerational earnings mobility remained stable in Taiwan from the early 1990s 
to the late 2000s.  
As discussed previously, using average earnings by occupation as a proxy for 
fathers’ permanent earnings is similar to using earnings imputed by occupation. Indeed, 
the estimates in columns (5) and (6) are not too different from the two-sample estimate 
in column (6) of Table 5. Because the microdata from the 1981 SFIE are available, we 
can compare results in columns (5) and (6) to those from the SFIE microdata to further 
quantify the potential bias in this proxy approach. In columns (7) and (8), we estimate 
intergenerational earnings elasticity by the Björklund and Jäntti two-sample approach, 
where fathers’ permanent earnings are predicted by seven occupation categories from 
the 1981 SFIE microdata. Since the main source of bias in the previous columns is 
probably due to division bias – that is, dividing average household earnings by the 
average number of people employed – in column (7), we use economic household heads 
as the secondary sample to correct such bias. However, we still do not restrict age and 
gender of these household heads. The two-sample estimate for intergenerational 
earnings elasticity equals 0.41, which is similar in magnitude to the estimates in 
columns (5) and (6), which use average earnings as a proxy. Therefore, division bias 
does not seem to be overly large in our data. In column (8), we further restrict household 
heads to males aged 35–50. Since most real fathers are household heads, the bias in 
column (7) should be small even without age and gender restriction. Indeed, the 
                                                 
26 In the 1968 SFIE report, transport workers and mining workers are separate from production workers 
and laborers. In the 1970 SFIE report, transport workers are reported as an individual category. In the 
1981 SFIE report, transport workers, production workers, and laborers are reported as three individual 
categories.  
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estimate in column (8) is 0.44, very close to that in column (7).27 While not reported in 
the paper, if fathers’ earnings are predicted in levels and then taken logarithms, the 
estimates in columns (7) and (8) are 0.46 and 0.49. As a robustness check, Appendix 
Table A2 shows the estimates from interval regressions.  
Table 8 shows the estimates for different age groups in both 1990–1994 and 
2005–2010. As in Table 6, we increase the age range to 30–55 years old. In the upper 
panel, we estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity based on the 1990–1994 TSCS 
and 1968 average earnings by occupation. In the lower panel, we estimate 
intergenerational earnings elasticity based on the 2005–2010 TSCS and 1981 average 
earnings by occupation. (We use seven occupation categories in both panels.) For both 
time periods, the estimates in column (1) remain similar to those in Table 7, so the 
results are not sensitive to using a wider age range. Columns (2) – (5) exhibit a pattern 
similar to Table 6 and indicate potential life-cycle bias in the youngest age group 
(column (2)). Notice that column (5) in the upper panel and column (2) in the lower 
panel cover the same cohort, but the estimates for intergenerational earnings elasticity 
are much smaller for when the workers are younger. Nevertheless, within each age 
group, there is little difference between the estimates from the two time periods, 
indicating stable intergenerational earnings mobility in Taiwan from the early 1990s to 
the late 2000s.  
To check the robustness of the results, in Table 9, instead of earnings, we use 
average wages as a proxy for fathers’ earnings. Although we expect the estimates to be 
further downward biased because wages only account for a fraction of earnings, one 
advantage is that average wages can be calculated from information about both 
employers and employees. We calculate the average wages (received) by occupation in 
1968, 1970, and 1981 from the SFIE reports, and the average wages (paid) by industry 
in 1966 and 1981 from the Industrial and Commercial Census (ICC) government 
reports. The ICC is a census conducted every five years of all business establishments 
in Taiwan. Because the ICC does not cover the agriculture, fishing, and forestry 
industry, the average wage for that industry is taken from the 1966 and 1981 SFIE. 
Similarly, these average wages are equivalent to wages predicted by occupation or 
                                                 
27 The estimates based on all earnings predictors (education, industry, and occupation) are 0.48 from the 
1981 SFIE and 0.44 from the 1981 MUS. 
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industry from a secondary sample without age or gender restriction. Therefore, our goal 
is not to obtain precise estimates but to compare estimates between the two periods.  
In Table 9, the estimates continue to suggest stable intergenerational mobility. 
In columns (1) – (3), the estimates are around 0.20 for 1990–1994; in columns (4) – (5), 
the estimates are around 0.25 for 2005–2010. As expected, the estimates are much 
smaller than those based on earnings in the previous tables, due to measurement error. 
In both periods, the estimates based on the SFIE data are almost identical to the 
estimates based on the ICC data. So the results are consistent across datasets even 
though all of our estimates are downward biased. The estimates in columns (4) – (5) 
seem to be slightly larger, probably because wages comprise a larger fraction of 
earnings in 1981 than in the late 1960s. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity in Taiwan in 
1990–1994 and 2005–2010. We use representative samples and correct problems 
common in the literature on Asian countries such as life-cycle bias and prediction bias. 
Our secondary samples for potential fathers are carefully chosen so that they are indeed 
representative of real fathers. We find that intergenerational earnings elasticity is 
around 0.4–0.5, similar to relatively less mobile countries such as the U.K and the U.S. 
As Taiwan and other Asian Tigers share many similarities, we suspect that the high 
estimated mobility is a result of estimation bias, and that true intergenerational earnings 
mobility in the Asian Tigers is much lower than the previous literature suggests. 
Surprisingly, our results show that the intergenerational earnings mobility in Taiwan 
has remained stable, despite dramatic economic and social changes during this period. 
One possible explanation is that the main channel for intergenerational income 
transmission is the intergenerational transmission of abilities, which is likely to be 
relatively stable. Indeed, we apply the decomposition method from Lefgren, Lindquist, 
and Sims (2012) to the 2005–2010 data and find that the majority of intergenerational 
earnings elasticity in Taiwan can be attributed to the effect of human capital 
transmission rather than the effect of parental financial resources.  
 Some limitations exist in the paper. First, the data for the fathers’ generation are 
limited in the earlier period. We can only rely on a single predictor, such as occupation, 
and we cannot apply the decomposition method, as we can for the more recent period. 
It could be the case that intergenerational earnings elasticities have remained about the 
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same, but the relative importance of causal channels has changed. In particular, 
education attainments and returns to education have increased considerably in Taiwan 
during this period. It is possible that human capital transmission effects have become 
more important in the more recent period as compared with the earlier period.  
Second, this paper focuses on intergenerational earnings elasticity that is 
measured at the mean. Research shows that intergenerational mobility could be 
nonlinear, and lower or higher at the tails of income distribution (Björklund and Jäntti 
2009).28 Although the intergenerational elasticity at the mean may be stable over time, 
it could have changed at the tails of income distribution. For example, better protection 
of property rights may increase intergenerational earnings transmission among high-
income people.  
In sum, this paper provides descriptive evidence of the relationship between 
economic development and intergenerational earnings mobility. Future studies may be 
able to address this topic with better data. Given the current state of the literature, more 
empirical research is needed to understand better the causal mechanisms behind the 
persistence of income inequality.  
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Figure 1:  Real GDP per capita in Taiwan, 1965–2010 (2011 Taiwanese dollars). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP Growth Rates in Taiwan, 1965–2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Gini Coefficients in Taiwan, 1968–2010. 
 
Note: Gini coefficients are unavailable for the years 1965–1967, 1969, 1971, 1973, 
and 1975. These Gini coefficients are from the 2012 Report on the Survey of 
Family Income and Expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the 2005–2010 TSCS and the 1978–1982 MUS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2005–10 TSCS Sons 
2005–10 
TSCS 
Fathers  
1978–82 
MUS 
Fathers 
Earnings (TWD/month) 50833.7  10504.6 (38668.8)  (7227.0) 
Age 42.7  42.3 (4.5)  (4.6) 
    
Education (%)    
No Formal Education 0.0 18.6 10.3 
Elementary School 4.1 54.2 57.2 
Middle School 21.4 11.2 11.0 
Vocational High School 36.0 4.5 7.3 
Academic High School 6.0 4.8 5.4 
Vocational College 17.7 3.5 3.6 
University and above 14.8 3.2 5.4 
    
Occupation (%)    
Professionals and Technicians 15.8 7.0 5.8 
Administrative Executives and Managerial Workers  9.3 5.6 2.0 
Clerical Workers 5.8 4.7 11.2 
Sales Workers 13.0 13.0 13.4 
Service Workers  10.0 7.2 6.5 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Workers 4.4 33.3 25.3 
Production Workers, Transport Workers, and 
Laborers 41.7 29.2 36.0 
    
Industry (%)    
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry  4.8 34.8 25.8 
Mining 0.5 1.7 1.8 
Manufacturing  29.4 16.1 21.6 
Utilities 0.7 0.9 0.9 
Construction  13.7 9.4 11.1 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 17.0 15.5 15.6 
Transport, Storage, and Communication 6.8 6.6 8.5 
Finance, Insurance, and Business Services  8.5 1.4 2.0 
Education, Public Administration, and Personal 
Services 18.6 13.6 12.8 
    
Obs. 1,299 1,299 29,254 
Note: Sampling weights are applied to all columns. Earnings are reported in nominal 
Taiwanese Dollars (TWD).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the 1990–1994 TSCS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1990 - 1994 TSCS Sons  
1990 - 1994 
TSCS 
Fathers  
1968 TW 
Statistical 
Abstract  
Earnings (TWD/month) 37319.7   (27481.8)   
Age 41.1   (4.4)   
    
Education (%)    
No Formal Education 2.9 36.0 20.8 
Elementary School 31.8 45.2 51.9 
Middle School 19.6 7.6 12.2 
Vocational High School 8.3 1.2 4.7 
Academic High School 15.7 5.1 5.4 
Vocational College 11.7 2.7 2.1 
University and above 10.1 2.3 2.8 
    
Occupation (%)    
Professionals and Technicians 10.5 4.0 3.8 
Administrative Executives and Managerial Workers  9.6 5.1 2.0 
Clerical Workers 9.0 7.5 6.0 
Sales Workers 15.9 11.0 9.9 
Service Workers  4.8 4.3 9.9 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Workers 13.9 50.8 47.3 
Production Workers, Transport Workers, and 
Laborers 36.2 17.3 21.0 
    
Industry (%)    
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry  14.3 51.4 45.2 
Mining 1.0 1.8 1.8 
Manufacturing  28.1 10.8 11.7 
Utilities 1.7 0.6 0.8 
Construction  12.2 5.6 3.2 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14.6 11.3 9.6 
Transport, Storage, and Communication 8.7 5.1 4.4 
Finance, Insurance, and Business Services  3.7 1.0 n/a 
Education, Public Administration, and Personal 
Services 15.8 12.5 23.3 
    
Obs. 2,143 2,143 n/a 
Note: Sampling weights are applied to columns (1) and (2). Earnings are reported in nominal 
Taiwanese Dollars (TWD). In column (3), the education distribution is based on the total male 
work force (age 15 and above), while the industry and occupational distributions are based on 
the employed male work force. The two service industries were not separated until 1971. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the 1968, 1970, and 1981 SFIE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 % 
Household 
Earnings 
(TWD/month) 
# People 
Employed 
    
Occupation 1968    
Professionals and Technicians 4.0 4,366 1.5 
Administrative Executives and Managerial Workers  2.2 5,248 1.8 
Clerical Workers 6.7 3,438 1.5 
Sales Workers 12.9 3,233 1.9 
Service Workers  4.6 2,411 1.6 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Workers 47.4 2,326 3.1 
Production Workers, Transport Workers, and 
Laborers 22.2 2,721 1.8 
    
Occupation 1970    
Professionals and Technicians 4.0 4,211 1.5 
Administrative Executives and Managerial Workers  3.9 5,476 1.6 
Clerical Workers 7.7 4,092 1.6 
Sales Workers 11.4 3,747 1.9 
Service Workers  4.4 2,965 1.6 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Workers 46.4 2,580 3.1 
Production Workers, Transport Workers, and 
Laborers 22.2 3,242 1.9 
    
Occupation 1981    
Professionals and Technicians 6.6 30,703 1.7 
Administrative Executives and Managerial Workers  4.2 34,513 1.7 
Clerical Workers 12.3 25,527 1.7 
Sales Workers 13.0 21,980 1.9 
Service Workers  5.8 19,336 1.8 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Workers 25.8 15,702 2.7 
Production Workers, Transport Workers, and 
Laborers 32.3 19,166 1.9 
Note: Earnings are reported in nominal Taiwanese Dollars (TWD). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: First Stage Regression from the 1978–1982 MUS 
        
Elementary 
School 
0.094***  Professionals 0.566***  Mining 0.273*** (0.009)  (0.037)  (0.038) 
Middle School 0.168***  Managerial Workers  
0.911***  Manufacturing  0.195*** (0.012)  (0.040)  (0.034) 
Academic 
High School 
0.206***  Clerical 
Workers 
0.531***  Utilities 0.209*** (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.043) 
Vocational 
High School 
0.234***  Sales Workers 0.398***  Construction  0.218*** (0.014)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
Vocational 
College 
0.264***  Service 
Workers  
0.338***  Wholesale 0.268*** (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
University and 
above 
0.408***  Production 
Worker 
0.292***  Transport 0.307*** (0.017)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
      Business 
Services  
0.288*** 
      (0.039) 
      Personal 
Services 
0.058* 
      (0.035) 
        
Obs. 29,254 
Adj. R2 0.46 
Partial Adj. R2 0.35 
Note: OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Age, 
age squared, and dummy variables for the years 1979–1982 are controlled in the 
regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity  
in 2005–2010 from Different Predictors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 All Predictors Industry & Occupation  
Education & 
Industry  
Education & 
Occupation  Industry  Occupation  Education 
IGE 0.449***  0.403***  0.480***  0.448***  0.403*** 0.401***  0.785*** (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.055)  (0.062)  (0.054)  (0.102) 
              
Obs. 1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity by Age Groups and Cohorts  
in 2005–2010 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Age Groups          
 
Ages 30-55 
(1950-1980)  
Ages 30-40 
(1965-1980)  
Ages 35-45 
(1960-1975)  
Ages 40-50 
(1955-1970)  
Ages 45-55 
(1950-1965) 
IGE 0.456***  0.319***  0.414***  0.500***  0.565*** (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.068) 
          
Obs. 2,015   816   856   937   863 
Cohorts          
 
1970-80      
(Ages 30-40)  
1965-74        
(Ages 31-45)  
1960-69        
(Ages 36-50)  
1955-64       
(Ages 41-55)  
1950-59      
(Ages 46-55) 
IGE 0.319***  0.372***  0.459***  0.527***  0.559*** (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.070)  (0.079) 
          
Obs. 596   728   825   831   594 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity in 1990–1994 and 2005–2010 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 1990–1994 TSCS  2005–2010 TSCS 
 
1968 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1970 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1968 SFIE 
9. Occ.  
1970 SFIE 
8 8. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
9. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
Microdata  
1981 SFIE 
Microdata 
(restricted) 
IGE 0.378***  0.375***  0.384***  0.381***  0.364***  0.365***  0.411***  0.444*** (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.061) 
                
Obs. 2,143   2,143   2,143   2,143   1,299   1,299  1,299   1,299 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity by Age Group  
in 1990–1994 and 2005–2010  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1990–1994 TSCS &1968 SFIE  
 
Ages 30-55 
(1950-1980)  
Ages 30-40 
(1965-1980)  
Ages 35-45 
(1960-1975)  
Ages 40-50 
(1955-1970)  
Ages 45-55 
(1950-1965) 
IGE 0.345***  0.245***  0.339***  0.428***  0.555*** (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.046) 
          
Obs. 3,292   1,876   1,721   1,241   874 
2005–2010 TSCS &1981 SFIE   
 
Ages 30-55 
(1935-1964)  
Ages 30-40 
(1950-1964)  
Ages 35-45 
(1945-1959)  
Ages 40-50 
(1940-1954)  
Ages 45-55 
(1935-1949) 
IGE 0.378***  0.273***  0.368***  0.390***  0.447*** (0.037)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.060) 
          
Obs. 2,015   816   856   937   863 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity  
in 1990–1994 and 2005–2010 from Predicted Wages 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 1990–1994 TSCS  2005–2010 TSCS 
 
1968 SFIE  
7. Occ.  
1970 SFIE  
7. Occ.  
1966 ICC  
9. Ind.  
1981 SFIE  
7. Occ.  
1981 ICC  
9. Ind. 
IGE 0.198***  0.200***  0.209***  0.252***  0.250*** (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
          
Obs. 2,143   2,143   2,143   1,299   1,299 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A1: Interval Regression Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity  
in 2005–2010 from Different Predictors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 All Predictors Industry & Occupation  
Education & 
Industry  
Education & 
Occupation  Industry  Occupation  Education 
              
 Interval Regression 
IGE 
0.443***  0.399***  0.469***  0.442***  0.391*** 0.397***  0.776*** 
(0.047)  (0.047)  (0.054)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.094) 
              
Obs. 1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299   1,299 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A2: Interval Regression Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity  
in 1990–1994 and 2005–2010 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 1990–1994 TSCS  2005–2010 TSCS 
 
1968 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1970 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1968 SFIE 
9. Occ.  
1970 SFIE 
8. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
7. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
9. Occ.  
1981 SFIE 
Microdata  
1981 SFIE 
Microdata 
(restricted) 
IGE 
0.369***  0.366***  0.375***  0.372***  0.361***  0.362***  0.408***  0.440*** 
(0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.057) 
                
Obs. 2,143   2,143   2,143   2,143   1,299   1,299  1,299   1,299 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
School of Economics and Finance | Victoria Business School | www.victoria.ac.nz/sef 
 
 
